In the meantime, al-Malik al-Muʾayyad was in the Qalʿa in the company of a small number of his mamlūks and the julbān mamlūks of his father. None of the amirs was with him, except for one mamlūk of his father, Qarājā al-Ṭawīl al-ʾAʿraj, an amir 10, who was as (good as) nothing, the ʾamīr ʾākhūr kabīr, Barsbāy al-Bajāsī, - if only he had not been with him!-, and Khayrbak al-Qaṣrawī, the nāʾib Qalʿat al-Jabal, who did him more harm than anybody else, as will appear from the record of his actions.
All this, while al-Malik al-Muʾayyad did not know the truth of what had been deciced regarding him. He did know, however, that the mamlūks and the amirs had assembled in the house of the ʾamīr kabīr, Khushqadam, and that they were confused. What he did not know was the subject (naṣṣ) that they were discussing.
Al-Malik al-Muʾayyad started asking about their conditions, and he expected that one of his father’s mamlūks should come to him. However, none of them ascended to him; rather, strangely enough, most of them were with the people (Popper: his enemies) at the house of the ʾamīr kabīr, helping against the son of their ʾustādh. If only they had been rewarded (for that later on), but they were repulsed (mudhabdhab, trsl. thus by Popper). As al-Malik al-Ẓāhir Khushqadam became sultan, he exterminated them, troubled them through detention and through removal of their rizqs, more so than he did vis-à-vis those who were on al-Muʾayyad’s side, may his hands not become crippled!
Al-Malik al-Muʾayyad, as often as he inquired into the matter of the fitna, nobody came to him with any clear news. No, the reports (that he did receive) were confused, and his ideas were weak. He failed to take a move, and he failed to pay attention to the matter of this assembly, until the matter had increased beyond all bounds, and the game had turned into something serious.
At that point, the mamlūks that were with him prepared themselves, and al-Malik al-Muʾayyad stood up, and went from the qāʿa of the Duhaysha to Qaṣr Sulṭānīya, which overlooked the Ramla. Then, he descended with those in his company to the Bāb al-Silsila. Before he had arrived at the ʾIṣṭabl, he was informed that the enemy (qawm, trsl. thus by Popper) had taken the Bāb al-Silsila, had taken possession of the ʾIṣṭabl Sulṭānī, and had taken amir Barsbāy al-Bajāsī, the ʾamīr ʾākhūr kabīr, captive, (having carried him off) to the ʾamīr kabīr, Khushqadam.
Taking the Bāb al-Silsila had been a stratagem of the aforementioned Barsbāy, and as the julbān heard that the Bāb al-Silsila had been taken, a party of them descended and clashed with those who were there of the troops of the ʾatābak, Khushqadam, and put them to flight. They took back the Bāb al-Silsila, which did not have an ʾamīr ʾākhūr.
The sultan, al-Malik al-Muʾayyad sat down in the maqʿad of the ʾIṣṭabl, which overlook the Ramla.
The fact that al-Muʾayyad did not descend to the ʾIṣṭabl (any sooner) is accounted for by several facts, one of them being the fact that he had feeled confident about the Bāb al-Silsila, as the ʾamīr ʾākhūr Barsbāy was somebody who had not taken sides with any of the two parties, and also because of the fact that he was related to him by marriage, being the husband of the daughter of his sister by amir Bardbak, the dawādār thānī (Bardbak being one of those who had been seized and who was now at the house of the  ʾatābak, Khushqadam), and also because his father, ʾĪnāl, was the one who had raised him and who had confered favours upon him.
Barsbāy, however, did not care for any of that. As someone said,
‘By your life! There is a reason behind everything!
O threshold of flight, you have blocked (yourself from me)!’
Another reason was the fact that he kept expecting one of his ʾaṣḥāb or his ḥawāshī, or one of the khujdāshīn or the mamlūks of his father to come to him, but none of them came. As he despaired of their coming, he left the Duhaysha, after he had been informed that the Bāb al-Silsila had been taken and then taken back by the mamlūks of his father, the julbān.
When he sat down in the maqʿad, he saw that the enemy (qawm) had grown numerous and that their number had increased, while he still had a small number of troops and fighters. He did not pay attention to that and, together with those who were with him, he started to defend himself.
However, number got the upperhand over courage. Also, courage was lacking as well, as did skill in conducting wars.
This was a case of being foresaken by God, exalted is He above all, for that day, none of the old mamlūks or of the khujdāshīn of his father ascended to him that day, and he was with only one amir, the aforementioned Qarājā. Of the ʾaʿyān of the khāṣṣakīya, there was only Fāris al-Baktamurī, one of the dawādārīya ʾajnād, and Muqbil, who had been his dawādār before he had become sultan. These three, (however), amounted to (as good) as nothing. Little men as these I mention only for the sake of recording.
Apart from these, al-Muʾayyad also had with him the julbān of his father, who were in the barracks, a large number of approximately 1,000. These were the ones whom his father, al-ʾAshraf, had bought from the tujjār after he had become sultan.
As for those whom he had bought from the legacy (tarka, trsl. by Popper as estate) of al-Ẓāhir Jaqmaq and from the mamlūks of the latter’ son, al-Malik al-Manṣūr ʿUthmān, who numbered over 200 and who were the ʾaʿyān of the mamlūks of al-ʾAshraf ʾĪnāl and who had held waẓīfas and ʾiqṭāʿs, amir Jānibak Nāʾib Jedda had won those over previously, by saying to them, ‘You are Ẓāhirīya, and the purchase of you by al-ʾAshraf is not valid!’ These then inclined towards his words, as well as his beneficence and his gifts, which exceeded all bounds, they joined the party of the Ẓāhirīya, and the lot rose together with him that day (against the sultan), and fougth the son of their ʾustādh most fiercely. That day, they became the ʾaʿyān of the troops in terms of youth, power and number, (in comparison to) those who were with ʾatābak Khushqadam of the Nāṣirīya, the Muʾayyadīya, the ʾAshrafīya, the Ẓāhirīya and the Sayfīya.